Detention; 1976 Case; Writ of habeas corpus; vs. Ex-General and President Fidel V. Ramos et. al.

WELLINGTON QUE REYES, petitioner, vs. GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), Camp Crame, Quezon City; MAJOR ROLANDO ABADILLA of the Metrocom Police Intelligence Section (MPIS), P.C. Camp Crame, Quezon City; LT. PANFILO LACSON of the MPIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City; SGT. JAIME ORILLOSA of the MPIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City; SGT. ESTANISLAO GAMBOA of the MPIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents. [G.R. No. L-40027. January 29, 1976.]

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This application for habeas corpus is premised on petitioner’s having been “confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty” in the stockade at Camp Crame, notwithstanding the absence of a formal complaint or accusation for any specific offense imputed to him, or of any judicial writ or order for his commitment.

xxx

The Supreme Court required counsel for respondent to explain why the case petitioner was not immediately referred to the civil authorities after the issuance of General Order No. 41, and also why petitioner had been detained without the supposed scheduled referral of the case to the City Fiscal’s Office. The Solicitor General manifested among others that petitioner had been granted temporary release from detention as of 1:45 p.m. of January 29, 1975 and on February 4, 1975, a permanent release.

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The Supreme Court held that the release of petitioner rendered the case moot and academic. It added that the writ itself was never suspended by virtue of the proclamation of Martial Law, and that there is no bar to a petition of this character especially where on the face of the application itself it appears that there is no justification for such detention.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; RELEASE OF DETAINED PERSON RENDERS PETITION MOOT AND ACADEMIC. — The release of a person under detention renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic.

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PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT SUSPEND PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS. — Where the restraint of liberty is premised under Proclamation No. 1081 and in pursuance of its express terms, the individual, whose release is sought, falls within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of habeas corpus has been suspended. Since the writ itself, however, is never suspended, there is no bar to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, where on the face of the application itself it appears that there is no justification for such detention. It is in that way that this writ of liberty serves a highly useful purpose. While it is to be assumed that no abuse of the broader powers under martial rule would be attempted by military officials, still, especially on the part of those in the lower echelon, and possibly due to excess of zeal, there could be detention without color of law. Should such a regrettable incident occur, certainly the courts are open for redress. Nor does the mere fact that the record of the petitioner attested to his frequent brushes with the law, preclude him from availing himself of the remedy. For “it is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.”

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This application for habeas corpus filed by Wellington Que Reyes, through a sister, is premised on his having been “confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty” in the stockade or detention cell at Camp Crame, Quezon City, notwithstanding the absence of a formal complaint or accusation for any specific offense imputed to him, or of any judicial writ or order for his commitment. It was further alleged therein that he had not committed any offense for which he could be arrested or deprived of his liberty. While General Fidel Ramos, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, was named as respondent, it was specifically made clear that as far as he was aware, such detention was ordered by respondent Major Rolando Abadilla of Camp Crame. Its last paragraph is worded thus: “That the new Constitution being in full operation and the civil court not [having] been abolished, the confinement of your petitioner under circumstances above narrated is utterly illegal, unjust and without any jurisdiction.”

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The petition was filed on January 25, 1975. Two days later, this Court issued the following resolution: “Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for habeas corpus, the Court Resolved: (a) to [issue] a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to this Court on Wednesday, January 29, 1975 at 10:00 a.m.; and (b) to require the respondents to file an [answer] thereto not later than January 28, 1975, and not to move to dismiss the petition.” The return was duly filed on January 28, 1975. It sought the dismissal thereof on the ground that there was a valid arrest and seizure order against petitioner: Then came the hearing on January 29, 1975 resulting in the following resolution of this Court: “When this case was called for hearing this morning, Atty. Apolo P. Gaminde, assisted by Atty. Belen E. Tuy, appeared and argued for the petitioners, while Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan, Col. Eustaquio Purugganan and Lt. Col. Felix R. Solomon of the Judge Advocate General’s Office, appeared and argued for the respondents. In compliance with the writ, the body of petitioner Wellington Reyes was brought before this Court. Counsel for respondents manifested that the case of the petitioner will be referred to the City Fiscal of Manila at 2:00 p.m. today. In view thereof, the Court Resolved to [require]: (a) the petitioner to [file] within five (5) days from notice a sworn manifestation stating the facts related to the alleged referral to the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila by the Judge Advocate General’s Office of the case of petitioner sometime in December 1974 and the alleged dismissal or recommendation of dismissal thereof by the Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, a copy of such sworn manifestation to be served on the Solicitor General who may file a counter-manifestation within the same period from receipt thereof; and (b) the counsel for respondent to [file] within five (5) days from notice hereof, a documented explanation of why the case of the petitioner was not immediately referred to the Civil Authorities after the issuance of General Order No. 41 and also why petitioner has been detained since January 24, 1975 without the supposed scheduled referral of the case to the City Fiscal’s Office.”

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On the very next day, January 30, 1975, a manifestation was filed by the Solicitor General. It reads thus: “1. Petitioner had been released from detention as of 1:45 p.m. of January 29, 1975, as evidenced by a copy of the Temporary Release Order No. 75-073, dated January 28, 1975, . . .; 2. The case against petitioner for falsification of public document was referred on January 29, 1975 to the office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City (docketed as I.S. No. 75-1652) and not to the Manila Fiscal, it appearing that the falsified public document was executed in Quezon City; . . . 3. Respondents further wish to state that TSgt. Jaime Orilloso and Sgt. Estanislao Gamboa of the Metrocom Police Intelligence Service apprehended petitioner on January 24, 1975 on the strength of the Arrest, Search and Seizure Order No. 2530 signed by the Secretary of National Defense, which order as of the time of petitioner’s arrest was still subsisting and had not been recalled. Manila, January 30, 1975.” Thereafter, the compliance offering the explanation as to why the case against petitioner was not immediately referred to the civilian authorities after the issuance of General Order No. 49 and why petitioner was detained since January 24, 1975 without the scheduled referral of the case to the City Fiscal’s Office, was submitted to this Court on February 21, 1975. It was signed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan. It is worded thus: “1. One Mrs. Marciana Abcede filed on September 3, 1973 a complaint for Estafa against petitioner with the PC Metrocom; 2. On January 16, 1974, Mrs. Abcede’s complaint was referred to the Judge Advocate General, AFP; 3. On the basis of Mrs. Abcede’s complaint, the Secretary of National Defense issued on February 26, 1974 [arrest, search and seizure order] No. 2530 for the apprehension of petitioner, . . .; 4. However, petitioner’s immediate arrest could not be effected because he was not found in any of his known addresses, and his whereabouts were unknown; 5. As the [arrest, search and seizure order] issued on February 26, 1974 continued to be effective and unexecuted, petitioner was arrested by elements of PC Metrocom, at about 10:30 in the morning of January 24, 1975 (Friday). He was immediately brought to Camp Crame for investigation. Said investigation included not only another complaint against petitioner filed by Mrs. Abcede with the PC on November 10, 1973, this time for Falsification of Public Documents, but eighteen (18) criminal cases and/or complaints as well. The investigating team came across these other cases when they looked into petitioner’s police records with the various police agencies in the Greater Manila area; 6. Investigating elements of the PC Metrocom proceeded thereafter to all Courts and offices where these criminal cases an/or complaints are pending trial and/or disposition, including the Office of Civil Relations, GHQ, AFP, at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, where the two complaints for Estafa were filed, to follow up the disposition and/or status of all these cases; in those cases where warrants of arrest were issued against petitioner, to verify if said warrants were served or executed. It took the PC Metrocom the whole afternoon of Friday (January 24, 1975) and all of the following day, Saturday (January 25, 1975), to carry out this series of actions; 7. Verification of said eighteen (18) cases and/or complaints, disclosed the following information: (a) Criminal Case No. 131535, for Estafa, dismissed upon desistance of offended party, (b) Criminal Case No. VII-142963, for Malicious Mischief, pending — out on bail, (c) Criminal Case No. VII-149769, for Slight Physical Injuries, pending — out on bail, (d) Criminal Case No. III-150828 for Grave Coercion, pending — out on bail, (e) Criminal Case No. III-159834, for Grave Threats, pending — out on bail, (f) I.S. No. 72-1767, for Estafa, pending, (g) Estafa, filed with MMP — no disposition on file (July 18, 1969), (h) Estafa, filed with MMP — no disposition on file (November 25, 1970), (i) Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, filed with MMP — no disposition on file (November 25, 1970), (j) Violation of Ordinance 2646 (Jaywalking) — no disposition on file (January 20, 1972, (k) Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, before Br. VI, CFI, Manila, dismissed, upon desistance of offended party, (1) Estafa, before Br. VIII, City Court, Manila, dismissed, upon desistance of offended party, (m) Estafa, before Br. VIII, City Court, Manila, pending, (n) Estafa complaint, filed with OCR, GHQ, AFP (1973) — no disposition on file (o) Estafa, complaint, filed with OCR, GHQ, AFP — no disposition on file, (p) Attempted Parricide, filed with MMP & Metrocom — closed due to complainant’s desistance, (q) Criminal Case No. 7143987, for Incriminatory Machination — case withdrawn, (r) Criminal Case No. 7143986, for Attempted Corruption of Public Official — case withdrawn by Reviewing Fiscal on November 15, 1971; 8. On January 27, 1975 (Monday), even before respondents could effect the actual transfer of petitioner’s case to the proper City Fiscal’s Office (considering limitations of time, facilities for investigation, etc.), this Honorable Court resolved to issue the Writ (habeas corpus) returnable to itself on Wednesday, January 29, 1975, at 10:00 a.m.; and to require respondents to file Answer not later than January 28, 1975; 9. From January 27 to January 29, 1975, respondents took no action on these cases and complaints, including Mrs. Abcede’s complaint for Falsification of Public Documents, by way of referring or indorsing them to the prosecuting agencies, the proceedings having become sub judice, respondents [being] of the impression that the matter should be left to the disposition of this Honorable Court; 10. On January 29, 1975, at about 2:00 in the afternoon, after the hearing in the morning of herein Petition before this Tribunal, respondents forwarded Mrs. Abcede’s complaint for Falsification of Public Documents to the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City (I.S. No. 75-1652); . . . 11. On the same date (January 29, 1975), at exactly 1:45 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner was granted temporary release [and] . . . on February 4, 1975, petitioner was granted permanent release. . . .”

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REVISED RULES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; REQUIREMENT OF VERIFIED POSITION PAPER APPLICABLE ONLY IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR ARBITERS.

REVISED RULES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; REQUIREMENT OF VERIFIED POSITION PAPER APPLICABLE ONLY IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR ARBITERS. — Petitioner asseverates that the NLRC erroneously anchored its ruling on Section 2, Rule VII of its Revised Rules. A perusal of this provision shows that the requirement of a verified position paper is applicable only in proceedings before the Labor Arbiters.

LACK OF VERIFICATION OF POSITION PAPER A FORMAL RATHER THAN A SUBSTANTIAL DEFECT. — There is a need to rectify another faux pas of the NLRC, namely, that Section 2, Rule VII of its Revised Rules is “not only procedural but also jurisdictional.” Even prior to the questioned decision of the NLRC, We have had an occasion to rule squarely that the lack of verification of the position paper is a formal, rather than a substantial defect. It is not fatal in this case. It could have been easily corrected by requiring an oath. xxx

VERIFIED ANSWER A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 2, RULE VII THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — The filing of a verified answer by petitioner before the POEA is a matter of record. Granting arguendo that it was still necessary for petitioner to verify its defenses and allegations in the position paper, the verified answer was in substantial compliance with Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC. After all, the averments and defenses raised in its position paper are mere clarifications of averments and defenses in the answer.

PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION RULES AND REGULATIONS; REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION APPLIES ONLY TO ANSWER. — Sections 2 and 5, Rule III, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations do not require verification of position papers. The requirement of verification applies only to an answer.

SECTIONS 2 AND 5, RULE III, BOOK VI THEREOF APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner correctly invokes the applicability in this case of Sections 2 and 5, Rule III, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, which provide: “Section 2. Filing of Answer. Within the period indicated in paragraph 1 of Section 1 hereof, the respondent shall file a verified answer, not a motion to dismiss, incorporating therein all pertinent documents in support of his defense. “Section 5. Judgment Based on Position Paper. Whenever summary judgment is not appropriate, the Hearing Officer shall direct the parties to the case to simultaneously submit their position papers and/or memoranda within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice after which the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.” instead of Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which provides: “Section 2. Submission of position papers. — During the initial conference/hearing, or immediately thereafter, the Labor Arbiter shall require the parties to simultaneously submit to him their respective verified position papers, which shall cover only the issues raised in the complaint, accompanied by all supporting documents then available to them and the affidavits of their witnesses which shall take the place of their direct testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege, or present evidence to prove, facts not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in their complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents. The parties shall furnish each other with copies of the position papers, together with the supporting affidavits and documents submitted by them.” Sections 2 and 5, Rule III, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations are the governing provisions because this case concerns adjudication proceedings before the POEA, which has the “original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all cases involving employer-employee relation arising out of or by virtue of . . . (a) contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment . . .” (Section 1, Rule I, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations). As pointed out by petitioner, verification of the position paper is not required therein; only the answer is required to be verified. From cd asia

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 87644. April 20, 1992.] G & P MANPOWER SERVICES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ORLANDO S. JIMENEZ AND ARMANDO S. JIMENEZ, respondents. Alcantara Alcoy Alegria Aloguinsan Argao Asturias Badian Balamban Bantayan Barili Boljoon Borbon Carmen Catmon Compostela Consolacion Cordova Daanbantayan Dumaguete Bais Sibulan Tampi Bacong Negros Bacolod Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan Tudela Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy Luz Kristin tct transfer certificate of title tax declaration birth certificate relocation survey surveying judicial titling administrative titling patent title denr cenro foreshore lease ecc environmental compliance certificate design build architect cebu engineer interior design designer residential commercial cebu property warehouse for rent for lease marc Christian yncierto ruz jan Edmond yncierto ruz Kristin Villanueva ruz Edmond mabalot ruz marriage certificate timber land forest land watershed agricultural lot land use conversion hearing trial illegal drugs trial lawyer business corporate lawyer labor lawyer immigration law bureau of immigration cebu

ADOPTION: ELDER SISTER ADOPTING A YOUNGER BROTHER.

ADOPTION: ELDER SISTER ADOPTING A YOUNGER BROTHER. — An elder sister may adopt a younger brother. There is no law that prohibits relatives, by blood or by affinity, from adopting one another. Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and petitioners-appellants are not among those prohibited from adopting. Again Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration is not one of those excluded by law. On the other hand, Art. 338 of the same code allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or step-mother. The last article removes all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature.

POLICY OF THE LAW. — The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them.

ADOPTION OF YOUNGER BROTHER BY ELDER SISTER; OBJECTION THAT ADOPTION WILL RESULT IN DUAL RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT PREVENT ADOPTION. — With respect to the objection that the adoption by the elder sister of a younger brother would result in a dual relationship between the parties, such that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Munoz, p. 104).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-22523. September 29, 1967.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA, LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

Alcantara Alcoy Alegria Aloguinsan Argao Asturias Badian Balamban Bantayan Barili Boljoon Borbon Carmen Catmon Compostela Consolacion Cordova Daanbantayan Dumaguete Bais Sibulan Tampi Bacong Negros Bacolod Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan Tudela Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy Luz Kristin

Is the seller/contractor responsible for inadequate plumbing after the sale?

They may be responsible if you can show that they were aware of the issue or problem but chose to not disclose it: a knowing or intentional nondisclosure of a significant problem or issue can be fraud, and fraud could provide a basis to sue and recover compensation (e.g. the cost to correct the situation). They key is you have to be able to show that they knew, or under the circumstances, logically must have known, that this line would cause a problem. If they reasonably did not know there would be an issue–and if they did not live in the house but were just renovating the house to sell, they may well not have known this would be a problem. If that’s the case then they would not be liable, since if they did not know of the problem, they would not be required to disclose it.

AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE IS NOT AFFECTED BY AN ALLEGATION SEEKING THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE

In an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate, would not oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions “incapable of pecuniary estimation,” such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on Venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate.

[G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997.]
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANGELITO C. TEH, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas, SPS. HERMINIO & CLARITA TAYAG @ SPS. GEORGE T. TIGLAO & CLARIZZA T. TIGLAO and/or @ TEOFILO M. ESGUERA, LEONOR M. ESGUERA, LETICIA M. ESGUERA, JOEL M. ESGUERA, RICARDO M. ESGUERA, VOLTAIRE E. TAYAG, BENITO I. TAYAG, MERLIE MALIG, ALBERTO T. TAYAG, ROSEMARIE T. TAYAG, LETICIA E. LULU and the REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.

Psychological incapacity

ISSUE: Whether respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations

RULING OF THE COURT:

Petitioner Failed to Prove Respondent’s Psychological Incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.” Finally, the “psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” The Court explained:
(a) Gravity — It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina case), the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code as follows:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in the Molina case.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner anchored her petition on respondent’s irresponsibility, infidelity, and homosexual tendencies. Petitioner likewise alleged that respondent tried to compel her to change her religious belief, and in one of their arguments, respondent also hit her. However, sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void.
In Marcos v. Marcos, the Court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person concerned. However, while an actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened petitioner’s claim of respondent’s psychological incapacity. 18 While the examination by a physician of a person to declare him or her psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified. 19 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Lapuz on respondent’s psychological incapacity was based only on her two-hour session with petitioner. Her testimony was characterized by the Court of Appeals as vague and ambiguous. She failed to prove psychological incapacity or identify its root cause. She failed to establish that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable. Dr. Lapuz testified:
Q- What, in your opinion are the causes of this incapacity?
A- I feel, your Honor, that there is some personality agenda on his part that I do not know because he has not come to see me but there are such men who can be very ardent lovers but suddenly will completely turn over. . .
Q- Is this a sort of personality disorder?
A- Yes, your Honor.
Q- Is that inherited or could have been acquired even before marriage?
A- It was there on the time of the inception of his personality, it was there. And my feeling is that these things do not happen overnight, one does not change spot overnight but that thing, like marriage, can completely turn-table his behavior.
Q- Doctora, do you think this kind of incapacity, this personality disorder, is there any possibility of curing it?
A- Very little at this time and sometimes, when they become older, like when they reach the age of 50’s or 60’s, they may settle down and finally give out and reveal interest in their families.
Q- In short, there is possibility that this incapacity of the respondent could be cured?
A- Only respondent’s physical decline of sexual urge, if the sexual urge would not decline, the incapacity will continue.
Q- Is there no medicine or is there any kind of medicine that can cure this kind of disorder?
A- None to my knowledge, your Honor. There is no magic feather in the psychiatric treatment. Perhaps, if the person would be willing and open enough and interested enough. . .
Even the recommendation in the Social Case Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Marissa P. Obrero-Ballon, who was assigned by the trial court to conduct a social case study on the parties, failed to show the existence of respondent’s psychological incapacity. The Social Welfare Officer instead found that petitioner was immature while respondent was responsible. She also found that the couple separated because of respondent’s infidelity.
Petitioner also failed to prove that respondent’s psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner only cited that during their honeymoon, she found it strange that respondent allowed their 15-year-old companion, the son of one of respondent’s house helpers, to sleep in their room. However, respondent explained that he and petitioner already stayed in a hotel for one night before they went to Baguio City and that they had sexual relations even before their marriage. Respondent explained that the boy was with them to take pictures and videos of their stay in Baguio City and had to stay with them in the room due to monetary constraints.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage

[G.R. No. 159220. September 22, 2008.]
MA. DARLENE DIMAYUGA-LAURENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JESSE LAURO LAURENA, respondents.

Change of name

Facts
Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino citizen. The petitioner’s birth certificate, which was registered in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.

On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition 5 for correction of name with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change the full name indicated in her birth certificate from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio Gan.” She claimed that she had been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in her school records from elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other government records.

XXX

A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. “In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. . . . What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.”


After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e., that she has been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner’s use of surname provide:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.

Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.

In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner’s birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father.


However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner’s evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father’s surname.

XXX

In Coseteng-Magpayo, the issue was the proper procedure to be followed when the change sought to be effected in the birth certificate affects the civil status of the respondent therein from legitimate to illegitimate. The respondent therein claimed that his parents were never legally married; he filed a petition to change his name from “Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo,” the name appearing in his birth certificate, to “Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng.” The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and, since there was no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and eventually granted the petition of the respondent therein by, inter alia, deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of his parents and correcting his surname from “Magpayo” to Coseteng.” The Court reversed the trial court’s decision since the proper remedy would have been to file a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled that the change sought by the respondent therein involves his civil status as a legitimate child; it may only be given due course through an adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court’s pronouncement in Coseteng-Magpayo finds no application in this case.

Finally, Lim likewise finds no application in this case. In Lim, the petition that was filed was for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; the petition sought, among others, is the correction of the surname of the respondent therein from “Yo” to “Yu.” Further, the respondent therein, although an illegitimate child, had long been using the surname of her father. It bears stressing that the birth certificate of the respondent therein indicated that her surname was the same as her father albeit misspelled. Thus, a correction of entry in her birth certificate is appropriate.

Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner’s birth certificate indicated that she bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.


WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 207147. September 14, 2016.
EMELITA BASILIO GAN