May an elder sister adopt a younger brother?

The text below are from an old Supreme Court Case –

The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
.

The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
“A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be adopted are also the parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latter’s legitimate brother.
.

“In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court, that incongruity, not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein, should prevent the adoption.”
.

The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
.

The facts are not disputed.
.

The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioners’) son by adoption. Evidence was presented that the order setting the case for hearing has been duly published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition registered to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction; nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry, Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.
.

It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child’s impairing health, his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
.

We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged “incongruity” that will result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter, will also be her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore, advanced that adoption among people who are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result, reliance being made upon the views expressed by this Court in McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.
.

In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee, married to a Filipina by whom he had one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two minor children of the wife had by her first husband. The lower court granted the petition of McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On appeal by the State, We reversed the decision. We said:
.

“The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none existed before. Where therefore the relationship of parents and child already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and step-children, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and superimpose another relationship of parent and child through adoption. Consequently, an express authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if not to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove any and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, article 338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That may have been the reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding adoption, authority to adopt a step-child by a step-father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding the general authorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant of the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of surplusage could plausibly have been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766 was unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-father could adopt a minor step- child anyway.

.

However, the inserting of section 766 was not entirely without reason. It seems to be an established principle in American jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a relationship where such already exists (the same philosophy underlying our codal provisions on adoption).

.

So some states have special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such as a grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate of natural child.”
.

Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American precedents would reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding the matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the Union, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption, although laws of other jurisdictions expressly provide that adoption may not take place within persons within a certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur. 628-629). Courts in some states hold that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any given case is considered. It would seem that in those states originally influenced by the civil law countries where adoption originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other states where common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied because they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
.

Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child-by the step-father or step-mother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord’s Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
.

With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Muñoz, p. 104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in pari materia, the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting dual relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result under our law on marriage when persons who are already related, by blood or by affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within the degrees prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed, notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship. And as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to be prevented.
.

For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of the subject minor, granted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SC Case IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA, LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants,

Tags Alcantara Alcoy moral damages Alegria actual damages Aloguinsan Argao Asturias Badian Balamban Bantayan Barili Boljoon Borbon Carmen Catmon Compostela Consolacion Cordova Daanbantayan Dumaguete Bais Sibulan Tampi Bacong Negros Bacolod Separation pay Resign Resignation Back wages Backwages Length of service pay benefit employee employer relationship Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan compensatory damages Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan attorney’s fees Tudela exemplary damages Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker nominal damages Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy temperate damages Luz liquidated damages Kristin tct transfer certificate of title tax declaration birth certificate relocation survey surveying judicial titling administrative titling patent title denr cenro foreshore lease ecc environmental compliance certificate design build architect cebu engineer interior design designer residential commercial cebu property warehouse for rent for lease marc Christian yncierto ruz jan Edmond yncierto ruz Kristin Villanueva ruz Edmond mabalot ruz marriage certificate timber land forest land watershed agricultural lot land use conversion hearing trial illegal drugs trial lawyer business corporate lawyer labor lawyer immigration law bureau of immigration cebu 9g visa search warrant warrant of arrest motion to quash information complaint police officers buy bust physical suffering shocked horrified mental anguish fright serious anxiety besmirched reputation sleepless nights wounded feelings moral shock social humiliation similar injuries

When is the payment of damages as well as attorney’s fees proper?

In a Supreme Court case, the following damages were awarded:

“xxx

The RTC awarded moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, plus P2,000.00 for every appearance, and costs of litigation.

.
Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly caused. Petitioner Rosalina has adequately established the factual basis for the award of moral damages when she testified that she felt shocked and horrified upon knowing of the foreclosure sale.

.

However, we find the RTC’s award of P2,000,000.00 excessive and unconscionable, and reduce the salve to P100,000.00.
.

Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. We reduce the RTC’s award of P500,000.00 to P30,000.00.
.

Attorneys fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest. We find the RTC’s award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00 proper.

xxx”

From the case of SPOUSES GILDARDO LOQUELLANO and ROSALINA JULIET B. LOQUELLANO, petitioners, xxx

Alcantara Alcoy moral damages Alegria actual damages Aloguinsan Argao Asturias Badian Balamban Bantayan Barili Boljoon Borbon Carmen Catmon Compostela Consolacion Cordova Daanbantayan Dumaguete Bais Sibulan Tampi Bacong Negros Bacolod Separation pay Resign Resignation Back wages Backwages Length of service pay benefit employee employer relationship Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan compensatory damages Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan attorney’s fees Tudela exemplary damages Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker nominal damages Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy temperate damages Luz liquidated damages Kristin tct transfer certificate of title tax declaration birth certificate relocation survey surveying judicial titling administrative titling patent title denr cenro foreshore lease ecc environmental compliance certificate design build architect cebu engineer interior design designer residential commercial cebu property warehouse for rent for lease marc Christian yncierto ruz jan Edmond yncierto ruz Kristin Villanueva ruz Edmond mabalot ruz marriage certificate timber land forest land watershed agricultural lot land use conversion hearing trial illegal drugs trial lawyer business corporate lawyer labor lawyer immigration law bureau of immigration cebu 9g visa search warrant warrant of arrest motion to quash information complaint police officers buy bust physical suffering shocked horrified mental anguish fright serious anxiety besmirched reputation sleepless nights wounded feelings moral shock social humiliation similar injuries

Case on the validity of an extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of debtor’s property

Petitioner Rosalina Juliet Loquellano used to be a regular employee in the Financial Central Department of respondent Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. (respondent bank). As such, she became an automatic member of respondent Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation-Staff Retirement Plan (HSBC-SRP) that provides retirement, disability and loan benefits to the bank’s employees. In 1988, petitioner Rosalina applied with respondent HSBC-SRP a housing loan in the amount of P400,000.00 payable in twenty-five (25) years at six percent (6%) per annum, through monthly salary deduction from petitioner Rosalina’s salary savings account with respondent HSBC. It was provided in the loan application that the loan was secured by setting-off petitioner Rosalina’s retirement benefits and chattel mortgage. She executed a promissory note for the payment of the said loan.

.
On September 5, 1990, petitioners spouses Gildardo and Rosalina Loquellano and Manuel S. Estacion, the managing trustee for and in behalf of the respondent HSBC-SRP, entered into a contract of real estate mortgage wherein petitioners constituted a mortgage over their house and lot covered by TCT No. 95422 (44867) of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to secure the payment of their housing loan. Petitioner Rosalina had been religiously paying the monthly installments and interests due on the housing loan through automatic salary deductions.

.
Subsequently, a labor dispute arose between the respondent bank and the bank union, to which petitioner Rosalina was a member, which culminated in a strike staged on December 22, 1993. Petitioner Rosalina, together with other bank employees, were dismissed from the service for abandonment, among others. Petitioner Rosalina and the other dismissed employees filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) an illegal dismissal case against the respondent bank. The LA declared the strike illegal and dismissed the complaint. The labor case had reached us through a petition for review on certiorari filed by the dismissed concerned employees and had already been decided by us on January 11, 2016. While we declared the strike illegal, we also held that the mere finding of such did not justify the wholesale termination of the strikers from their employment. We found that there was illegal dismissal and ordered the bank, among others, to pay the backwages and separation pay of the 18 employees named in the decision, which included petitioner Rosalina, in lieu of reinstatement.

.
In the meantime, due to petitioner Rosalina’s termination from employment with the bank on December 27, 1993, petitioners were unable to make any payments of the amortizations due in Rosalina’s salary savings account beginning January 1994. Respondent HSBC-SRP sent demand letters dated June 13, 1994 and November 28, 1994, respectively, to petitioner Rosalina for the payment of her outstanding obligation in full. Petitioner Rosalina offered to make partial payment of her housing loan arrears in the amount of P69,205.99, which respondent HSBC-SRP rejected.
.

Subsequently, petitioner Rosalina received an Installment Due Reminder dated July 26, 1995 issued by respondent HSBC-SRP on her housing loan, wherein it was shown that the monthly installment overdue, the interest overdue and the interest accrued on the overdue installment amounted to P55,681.85 and the outstanding loan balance was P315,958.00. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Rosalina, through her salary savings account which was still existing, deposited the payments for all her monthly installment arrears and interests, and penalties from January 1994 up to August 1995. Respondent bank accepted the payments and credited them to her housing loan account. Thereafter, petitioner Rosalina received an Installment Due Reminder dated August 28, 1995, wherein it already reflected the payments she had made as her outstanding housing loan obligation was already reduced to P289,945.00.
.

In a letter dated September 25, 1995 to petitioner Rosalina, respondent HSBC-SRP demanded for the payment of the entire housing loan obligation in the amount of P289,945.00. Notwithstanding, petitioner Rosalina received an Installment Due Reminder dated September 27, 1995, reflecting the then current monthly installment and interest due thereon. Petitioner Rosalina, subsequently, received more installment due reminders showing a reduction in the outstanding balance of her housing loan. She continuously made deposits to her salary savings account with the respondent bank for the payment of her monthly amortizations. Respondent bank debited petitioner Rosalina’s savings account and credited the payments to the balance of the installment and the interest due on the housing loan up to June 1996.
On May 20, 1996, petitioners’ mortgaged property was extrajudicially foreclosed by respondent HSBC-SRP and was sold at public auction for the amount of P324,119.59, with respondent Manuel S. Estacion as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale dated June 5, 1996 was issued.

.
On August 22, 1996, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274, a Complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages and Preliminary Injunction against Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd.; Manuel S. Estacion; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation-Staff Retirement Plan, as represented by Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Mr. Stuart P. Milne and Mr. Alejandro L. Custodio; Leonarda Leilani Amurao and Benedicto G. Hebron, in their capacities as Clerk of Court/Ex-Officio Sheriff and Sheriff-in-Charge of the RTC of Parañaque. Petitioners alleged, among others, that the foreclosure of their mortgaged property was tainted with bad faith, considering that they had paid all the arrears, interests and penalties due on their housing loan since August 1995, and were updated with their loan obligations up to June 1996.

.
In their Answer, respondents HSBC-SRP and Estacion argued that the entire loan obligations accelerated when petitioner Rosalina was terminated and ceased to be an employee of respondent bank as provided in the HSBC-SRP Rules and Regulations, and she failed to pay the entire balance of the housing loan. Also, petitioners were in default, having failed to pay the amortizations beginning January 1994 up to July 1995; thus, they had the right to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged property under their mortgage contract.
.

Respondent bank claimed that it should not have been impleaded in the complaint, since it was not privy to the real estate mortgage nor to the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.

xxx

The issues for resolution are (1) whether the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of petitioners’ property by respondent HSBC-SRP on May 20, 1996 was valid; and (2) whether petitioners are entitled to the payment of damages as well as attorney’s fees.
xxx

We find that respondent HSBC-SRP’s filing of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on May 20, 1996 has no basis and, therefore, invalid.
.

It is established that petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations of their housing loan secured by a real estate mortgage on their property since January 1994, i.e., after petitioner Rosalina was terminated by the bank on December 27, 1993. Thus, respondent HSBC-SRP sent demand letters dated June 13, 1994 and November 28, 1994 to petitioner Rosalina asking her to pay the outstanding housing loan obligation in full. Petitioner Rosalina’s offer of partial payment was rejected by respondent HSBC-SRP. In the meantime, no foreclosure proceedings was yet filed by respondent HSBC-SRP against petitioners’ mortgaged property. Subsequently, petitioner Rosalina received an Installment Due Reminder dated July 26, 1995, informing her of the overdue monthly amortizations, interests and penalty in the amount of P55,681.85, with an outstanding balance of P315,958.00. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Rosalina then deposited in her salary savings account the payment for all the principal and interest arrearages from January 1994 up to August 1995. The payments she made in her account were accepted by respondent bank and credited them to the payment of the overdue monthly amortizations of her housing loan.

.
While respondent HSBC-SRP wrote petitioner Rosalina a letter dated September 25, 1995 demanding payment of the latter’s entire unpaid housing loan obligation, now with a reduced balance in the amount of P289,945.00, however, petitioner Rosalina still received an Installment Due Reminder dated September 27, 1995 reminding her of her monthly installment and interest due, sans penalty charge, which she paid.

.

Thereafter, petitioner Rosalina continuously received Installment Due Reminders for the housing loan, to wit: dated December 21, 1995, February 26, 1996, March 13, 1996 and April 11, 1996, which showed a diminishing loan balance by reason of respondent HSBC-SRP’s acceptance of payments of her monthly installments and interests due from September 1995 up to June 1996. Therefore, respondent HSBC-SRP is now estopped from foreclosing the mortgage property on May 20, 1996.
.

Article 1431 of the Civil Code defines estoppel as follows:
.

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
.

And Section 2 (a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides:
.

SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
.

Estoppel is a doctrine that prevents a person from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude, or action if it will result in injury to another. One who, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, can no longer deny the existence of such fact as it will prejudice the latter. The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice. It springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where, without its aid, injustice might result.

.
To stress, respondent HSBC-SRP continuously sent out monthly Installment Due Reminders to petitioner Rosalina despite its demand letter dated September 25, 1995 to pay the full amount of the loan obligation within 3 days from receipt of the letter. It, likewise, continuously accepted petitioner Rosalina’s subsequent monthly amortization payments until June 1996; thus, making their default immaterial. Moreover, there was no more demand for the payment of the full obligation afterwards. Consequently, petitioners were made to believe that respondent HSBC-SRP was applying their payments to their monthly loan obligations as it had done before. It is now estopped from enforcing its right to foreclose by reason of its acceptance of the delayed payments.

.
Also, Article 1235 of the Civil Code provides that when the creditor accepts performance, knowing its incompleteness and irregularity without protest or objection, the obligation is deemed complied with. Respondent HSBC-SRP accepted Rosalina’s payment of her housing loan account for almost one year without any objection.
Respondent HSBC-SRP argues that estoppel is not applicable since the payments upon which petitioners rely were made without its knowledge and consent; that the updated balances were automatically generated by the system; that petitioner Rosalina made unilateral payments to her salary savings account knowing that any amount she deposited therein will be automatically credited as payments for her loan obligations.
.

We are not persuaded.
.

It is respondent HSBC-SRP, not petitioner Rosalina, which has access and control of the computer system with regard to the crediting of the housing loan payments. It cannot now deny its action of continuously accepting petitioner Rosalina’s monthly amortizations, coupled with the sending out of installment due reminders, and statements of her updated housing loan account to prejudice petitioners who relied thereon.
.

We find that petitioners are entitled to damages for the invalid foreclosure of their property. The RTC held respondent bank HSBC-SRP and Estacion solidarily liable for the payment of damages. However, we only find respondent HSBC-SRP liable as it was the one which illegally foreclosed petitioners’ mortgaged property. However, respondent HSBC, as correctly pointed out by the CA, was not a party to the real estate mortgage executed between respondent HSBC-SRP and petitioners nor it had participation in the foreclosure proceedings. On the other hand, Estacion was only a trustee of respondent HSBC-SRP acting within the scope of its authority.
.

The RTC awarded moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, plus P2,000.00 for every appearance, and costs of litigation.

.
Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly caused. Petitioner Rosalina has adequately established the factual basis for the award of moral damages when she testified that she felt shocked and horrified upon knowing of the foreclosure sale. However, we find the RTC’s award of P2,000,000.00 excessive and unconscionable, and reduce the salve to P100,000.00.

.
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 36 We reduce the RTC’s award of P500,000.00 to P30,000.00.
.

Attorneys fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest. We find the RTC’s award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00 proper.
xxx

This is from a supreme court case SPOUSES GILDARDO LOQUELLANO and ROSALINA JULIET B. LOQUELLANO, petitioners xxx Tags: Resign Resignation Back wages Backwages Length of service pay benefit employee employer relationship Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan Tudela Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy Luz Kristin tct transfer certificate of title tax declaration birth certificate relocation survey surveying judicial titling administrative titling patent title

denr cenro foreshore lease ecc environmental compliance certificate design build architect cebu engineer interior design designer residential commercial cebu property warehouse for rent for lease marc Christian yncierto ruz jan Edmond yncierto ruz Kristin Villanueva ruz Edmond mabalot ruz marriage certificate timber land forest land watershed agricultural lot land use conversion hearing trial illegal drugs trial lawyer business corporate lawyer labor lawyer immigration law bureau of immigration cebu 9g visa search warrant warrant of arrest motion to quash information complaint police officers buy bust extra-judicial extrajudicial foreclosure

Alcantara Alcoy Alegria Aloguinsan Argao Asturias Badian Balamban Bantayan Barili Boljoon Borbon Carmen Catmon Compostela Consolacion Cordova Daanbantayan Dumaguete Bais Sibulan Tampi Bacong Negros Bacolod Separation pay Resign Resignation Back wages Backwages Length of service pay benefit employee employer relationship Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan Tudela Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy Luz Kristin tct transfer certificate of title tax declaration

Detention; 1976 Case; Writ of habeas corpus; vs. Ex-General and President Fidel V. Ramos et. al.

WELLINGTON QUE REYES, petitioner, vs. GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), Camp Crame, Quezon City; MAJOR ROLANDO ABADILLA of the Metrocom Police Intelligence Section (MPIS), P.C. Camp Crame, Quezon City; LT. PANFILO LACSON of the MPIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City; SGT. JAIME ORILLOSA of the MPIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City; SGT. ESTANISLAO GAMBOA of the MPIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents. [G.R. No. L-40027. January 29, 1976.]

xxx

This application for habeas corpus is premised on petitioner’s having been “confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty” in the stockade at Camp Crame, notwithstanding the absence of a formal complaint or accusation for any specific offense imputed to him, or of any judicial writ or order for his commitment.

xxx

The Supreme Court required counsel for respondent to explain why the case petitioner was not immediately referred to the civil authorities after the issuance of General Order No. 41, and also why petitioner had been detained without the supposed scheduled referral of the case to the City Fiscal’s Office. The Solicitor General manifested among others that petitioner had been granted temporary release from detention as of 1:45 p.m. of January 29, 1975 and on February 4, 1975, a permanent release.

xxx

The Supreme Court held that the release of petitioner rendered the case moot and academic. It added that the writ itself was never suspended by virtue of the proclamation of Martial Law, and that there is no bar to a petition of this character especially where on the face of the application itself it appears that there is no justification for such detention.

xxx

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; RELEASE OF DETAINED PERSON RENDERS PETITION MOOT AND ACADEMIC. — The release of a person under detention renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic.

xxx

PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT SUSPEND PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS. — Where the restraint of liberty is premised under Proclamation No. 1081 and in pursuance of its express terms, the individual, whose release is sought, falls within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of habeas corpus has been suspended. Since the writ itself, however, is never suspended, there is no bar to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, where on the face of the application itself it appears that there is no justification for such detention. It is in that way that this writ of liberty serves a highly useful purpose. While it is to be assumed that no abuse of the broader powers under martial rule would be attempted by military officials, still, especially on the part of those in the lower echelon, and possibly due to excess of zeal, there could be detention without color of law. Should such a regrettable incident occur, certainly the courts are open for redress. Nor does the mere fact that the record of the petitioner attested to his frequent brushes with the law, preclude him from availing himself of the remedy. For “it is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.”

xxx

This application for habeas corpus filed by Wellington Que Reyes, through a sister, is premised on his having been “confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty” in the stockade or detention cell at Camp Crame, Quezon City, notwithstanding the absence of a formal complaint or accusation for any specific offense imputed to him, or of any judicial writ or order for his commitment. It was further alleged therein that he had not committed any offense for which he could be arrested or deprived of his liberty. While General Fidel Ramos, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, was named as respondent, it was specifically made clear that as far as he was aware, such detention was ordered by respondent Major Rolando Abadilla of Camp Crame. Its last paragraph is worded thus: “That the new Constitution being in full operation and the civil court not [having] been abolished, the confinement of your petitioner under circumstances above narrated is utterly illegal, unjust and without any jurisdiction.”

.

The petition was filed on January 25, 1975. Two days later, this Court issued the following resolution: “Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for habeas corpus, the Court Resolved: (a) to [issue] a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to this Court on Wednesday, January 29, 1975 at 10:00 a.m.; and (b) to require the respondents to file an [answer] thereto not later than January 28, 1975, and not to move to dismiss the petition.” The return was duly filed on January 28, 1975. It sought the dismissal thereof on the ground that there was a valid arrest and seizure order against petitioner: Then came the hearing on January 29, 1975 resulting in the following resolution of this Court: “When this case was called for hearing this morning, Atty. Apolo P. Gaminde, assisted by Atty. Belen E. Tuy, appeared and argued for the petitioners, while Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan, Col. Eustaquio Purugganan and Lt. Col. Felix R. Solomon of the Judge Advocate General’s Office, appeared and argued for the respondents. In compliance with the writ, the body of petitioner Wellington Reyes was brought before this Court. Counsel for respondents manifested that the case of the petitioner will be referred to the City Fiscal of Manila at 2:00 p.m. today. In view thereof, the Court Resolved to [require]: (a) the petitioner to [file] within five (5) days from notice a sworn manifestation stating the facts related to the alleged referral to the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila by the Judge Advocate General’s Office of the case of petitioner sometime in December 1974 and the alleged dismissal or recommendation of dismissal thereof by the Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, a copy of such sworn manifestation to be served on the Solicitor General who may file a counter-manifestation within the same period from receipt thereof; and (b) the counsel for respondent to [file] within five (5) days from notice hereof, a documented explanation of why the case of the petitioner was not immediately referred to the Civil Authorities after the issuance of General Order No. 41 and also why petitioner has been detained since January 24, 1975 without the supposed scheduled referral of the case to the City Fiscal’s Office.”

.

On the very next day, January 30, 1975, a manifestation was filed by the Solicitor General. It reads thus: “1. Petitioner had been released from detention as of 1:45 p.m. of January 29, 1975, as evidenced by a copy of the Temporary Release Order No. 75-073, dated January 28, 1975, . . .; 2. The case against petitioner for falsification of public document was referred on January 29, 1975 to the office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City (docketed as I.S. No. 75-1652) and not to the Manila Fiscal, it appearing that the falsified public document was executed in Quezon City; . . . 3. Respondents further wish to state that TSgt. Jaime Orilloso and Sgt. Estanislao Gamboa of the Metrocom Police Intelligence Service apprehended petitioner on January 24, 1975 on the strength of the Arrest, Search and Seizure Order No. 2530 signed by the Secretary of National Defense, which order as of the time of petitioner’s arrest was still subsisting and had not been recalled. Manila, January 30, 1975.” Thereafter, the compliance offering the explanation as to why the case against petitioner was not immediately referred to the civilian authorities after the issuance of General Order No. 49 and why petitioner was detained since January 24, 1975 without the scheduled referral of the case to the City Fiscal’s Office, was submitted to this Court on February 21, 1975. It was signed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan. It is worded thus: “1. One Mrs. Marciana Abcede filed on September 3, 1973 a complaint for Estafa against petitioner with the PC Metrocom; 2. On January 16, 1974, Mrs. Abcede’s complaint was referred to the Judge Advocate General, AFP; 3. On the basis of Mrs. Abcede’s complaint, the Secretary of National Defense issued on February 26, 1974 [arrest, search and seizure order] No. 2530 for the apprehension of petitioner, . . .; 4. However, petitioner’s immediate arrest could not be effected because he was not found in any of his known addresses, and his whereabouts were unknown; 5. As the [arrest, search and seizure order] issued on February 26, 1974 continued to be effective and unexecuted, petitioner was arrested by elements of PC Metrocom, at about 10:30 in the morning of January 24, 1975 (Friday). He was immediately brought to Camp Crame for investigation. Said investigation included not only another complaint against petitioner filed by Mrs. Abcede with the PC on November 10, 1973, this time for Falsification of Public Documents, but eighteen (18) criminal cases and/or complaints as well. The investigating team came across these other cases when they looked into petitioner’s police records with the various police agencies in the Greater Manila area; 6. Investigating elements of the PC Metrocom proceeded thereafter to all Courts and offices where these criminal cases an/or complaints are pending trial and/or disposition, including the Office of Civil Relations, GHQ, AFP, at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, where the two complaints for Estafa were filed, to follow up the disposition and/or status of all these cases; in those cases where warrants of arrest were issued against petitioner, to verify if said warrants were served or executed. It took the PC Metrocom the whole afternoon of Friday (January 24, 1975) and all of the following day, Saturday (January 25, 1975), to carry out this series of actions; 7. Verification of said eighteen (18) cases and/or complaints, disclosed the following information: (a) Criminal Case No. 131535, for Estafa, dismissed upon desistance of offended party, (b) Criminal Case No. VII-142963, for Malicious Mischief, pending — out on bail, (c) Criminal Case No. VII-149769, for Slight Physical Injuries, pending — out on bail, (d) Criminal Case No. III-150828 for Grave Coercion, pending — out on bail, (e) Criminal Case No. III-159834, for Grave Threats, pending — out on bail, (f) I.S. No. 72-1767, for Estafa, pending, (g) Estafa, filed with MMP — no disposition on file (July 18, 1969), (h) Estafa, filed with MMP — no disposition on file (November 25, 1970), (i) Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, filed with MMP — no disposition on file (November 25, 1970), (j) Violation of Ordinance 2646 (Jaywalking) — no disposition on file (January 20, 1972, (k) Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, before Br. VI, CFI, Manila, dismissed, upon desistance of offended party, (1) Estafa, before Br. VIII, City Court, Manila, dismissed, upon desistance of offended party, (m) Estafa, before Br. VIII, City Court, Manila, pending, (n) Estafa complaint, filed with OCR, GHQ, AFP (1973) — no disposition on file (o) Estafa, complaint, filed with OCR, GHQ, AFP — no disposition on file, (p) Attempted Parricide, filed with MMP & Metrocom — closed due to complainant’s desistance, (q) Criminal Case No. 7143987, for Incriminatory Machination — case withdrawn, (r) Criminal Case No. 7143986, for Attempted Corruption of Public Official — case withdrawn by Reviewing Fiscal on November 15, 1971; 8. On January 27, 1975 (Monday), even before respondents could effect the actual transfer of petitioner’s case to the proper City Fiscal’s Office (considering limitations of time, facilities for investigation, etc.), this Honorable Court resolved to issue the Writ (habeas corpus) returnable to itself on Wednesday, January 29, 1975, at 10:00 a.m.; and to require respondents to file Answer not later than January 28, 1975; 9. From January 27 to January 29, 1975, respondents took no action on these cases and complaints, including Mrs. Abcede’s complaint for Falsification of Public Documents, by way of referring or indorsing them to the prosecuting agencies, the proceedings having become sub judice, respondents [being] of the impression that the matter should be left to the disposition of this Honorable Court; 10. On January 29, 1975, at about 2:00 in the afternoon, after the hearing in the morning of herein Petition before this Tribunal, respondents forwarded Mrs. Abcede’s complaint for Falsification of Public Documents to the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City (I.S. No. 75-1652); . . . 11. On the same date (January 29, 1975), at exactly 1:45 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner was granted temporary release [and] . . . on February 4, 1975, petitioner was granted permanent release. . . .”

xxx

ADOPTION: ELDER SISTER ADOPTING A YOUNGER BROTHER.

ADOPTION: ELDER SISTER ADOPTING A YOUNGER BROTHER. — An elder sister may adopt a younger brother. There is no law that prohibits relatives, by blood or by affinity, from adopting one another. Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and petitioners-appellants are not among those prohibited from adopting. Again Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration is not one of those excluded by law. On the other hand, Art. 338 of the same code allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or step-mother. The last article removes all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature.

POLICY OF THE LAW. — The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them.

ADOPTION OF YOUNGER BROTHER BY ELDER SISTER; OBJECTION THAT ADOPTION WILL RESULT IN DUAL RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT PREVENT ADOPTION. — With respect to the objection that the adoption by the elder sister of a younger brother would result in a dual relationship between the parties, such that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Munoz, p. 104).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-22523. September 29, 1967.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA, LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

Alcantara Alcoy Alegria Aloguinsan Argao Asturias Badian Balamban Bantayan Barili Boljoon Borbon Carmen Catmon Compostela Consolacion Cordova Daanbantayan Dumaguete Bais Sibulan Tampi Bacong Negros Bacolod Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan Tudela Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy Luz Kristin

AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE IS NOT AFFECTED BY AN ALLEGATION SEEKING THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE

In an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate, would not oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions “incapable of pecuniary estimation,” such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on Venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate.

[G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997.]
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANGELITO C. TEH, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas, SPS. HERMINIO & CLARITA TAYAG @ SPS. GEORGE T. TIGLAO & CLARIZZA T. TIGLAO and/or @ TEOFILO M. ESGUERA, LEONOR M. ESGUERA, LETICIA M. ESGUERA, JOEL M. ESGUERA, RICARDO M. ESGUERA, VOLTAIRE E. TAYAG, BENITO I. TAYAG, MERLIE MALIG, ALBERTO T. TAYAG, ROSEMARIE T. TAYAG, LETICIA E. LULU and the REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.

Psychological incapacity

ISSUE: Whether respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations

RULING OF THE COURT:

Petitioner Failed to Prove Respondent’s Psychological Incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.” Finally, the “psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” The Court explained:
(a) Gravity — It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina case), the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code as follows:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in the Molina case.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner anchored her petition on respondent’s irresponsibility, infidelity, and homosexual tendencies. Petitioner likewise alleged that respondent tried to compel her to change her religious belief, and in one of their arguments, respondent also hit her. However, sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void.
In Marcos v. Marcos, the Court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person concerned. However, while an actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened petitioner’s claim of respondent’s psychological incapacity. 18 While the examination by a physician of a person to declare him or her psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified. 19 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Lapuz on respondent’s psychological incapacity was based only on her two-hour session with petitioner. Her testimony was characterized by the Court of Appeals as vague and ambiguous. She failed to prove psychological incapacity or identify its root cause. She failed to establish that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable. Dr. Lapuz testified:
Q- What, in your opinion are the causes of this incapacity?
A- I feel, your Honor, that there is some personality agenda on his part that I do not know because he has not come to see me but there are such men who can be very ardent lovers but suddenly will completely turn over. . .
Q- Is this a sort of personality disorder?
A- Yes, your Honor.
Q- Is that inherited or could have been acquired even before marriage?
A- It was there on the time of the inception of his personality, it was there. And my feeling is that these things do not happen overnight, one does not change spot overnight but that thing, like marriage, can completely turn-table his behavior.
Q- Doctora, do you think this kind of incapacity, this personality disorder, is there any possibility of curing it?
A- Very little at this time and sometimes, when they become older, like when they reach the age of 50’s or 60’s, they may settle down and finally give out and reveal interest in their families.
Q- In short, there is possibility that this incapacity of the respondent could be cured?
A- Only respondent’s physical decline of sexual urge, if the sexual urge would not decline, the incapacity will continue.
Q- Is there no medicine or is there any kind of medicine that can cure this kind of disorder?
A- None to my knowledge, your Honor. There is no magic feather in the psychiatric treatment. Perhaps, if the person would be willing and open enough and interested enough. . .
Even the recommendation in the Social Case Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Marissa P. Obrero-Ballon, who was assigned by the trial court to conduct a social case study on the parties, failed to show the existence of respondent’s psychological incapacity. The Social Welfare Officer instead found that petitioner was immature while respondent was responsible. She also found that the couple separated because of respondent’s infidelity.
Petitioner also failed to prove that respondent’s psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner only cited that during their honeymoon, she found it strange that respondent allowed their 15-year-old companion, the son of one of respondent’s house helpers, to sleep in their room. However, respondent explained that he and petitioner already stayed in a hotel for one night before they went to Baguio City and that they had sexual relations even before their marriage. Respondent explained that the boy was with them to take pictures and videos of their stay in Baguio City and had to stay with them in the room due to monetary constraints.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage

[G.R. No. 159220. September 22, 2008.]
MA. DARLENE DIMAYUGA-LAURENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JESSE LAURO LAURENA, respondents.

Change of name

Facts
Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino citizen. The petitioner’s birth certificate, which was registered in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.

On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition 5 for correction of name with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change the full name indicated in her birth certificate from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio Gan.” She claimed that she had been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in her school records from elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other government records.

XXX

A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. “In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. . . . What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.”


After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e., that she has been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner’s use of surname provide:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.

Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.

In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner’s birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father.


However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner’s evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father’s surname.

XXX

In Coseteng-Magpayo, the issue was the proper procedure to be followed when the change sought to be effected in the birth certificate affects the civil status of the respondent therein from legitimate to illegitimate. The respondent therein claimed that his parents were never legally married; he filed a petition to change his name from “Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo,” the name appearing in his birth certificate, to “Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng.” The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and, since there was no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and eventually granted the petition of the respondent therein by, inter alia, deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of his parents and correcting his surname from “Magpayo” to Coseteng.” The Court reversed the trial court’s decision since the proper remedy would have been to file a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled that the change sought by the respondent therein involves his civil status as a legitimate child; it may only be given due course through an adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court’s pronouncement in Coseteng-Magpayo finds no application in this case.

Finally, Lim likewise finds no application in this case. In Lim, the petition that was filed was for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; the petition sought, among others, is the correction of the surname of the respondent therein from “Yo” to “Yu.” Further, the respondent therein, although an illegitimate child, had long been using the surname of her father. It bears stressing that the birth certificate of the respondent therein indicated that her surname was the same as her father albeit misspelled. Thus, a correction of entry in her birth certificate is appropriate.

Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner’s birth certificate indicated that she bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.


WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 207147. September 14, 2016.
EMELITA BASILIO GAN

Newspaper publication

On the third assignment of error (lack of publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the place where the property is located), petitioners argue that the Olongapo News, the newspaper where the notice of public auction was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, was not a newspaper of general circulation in Morong, Bataan, in the year 1978, and that the situs of its circulation was not where the subject property is located.

xxx


To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it is published at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also be devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation.

The testimonies of witnesses Deputy Sheriff Renato Robles, Susana Curiano, and Cesar De La Torre, are enlightening on the matter. Their testimonies point to the unmistakable conclusion that, indeed, the Olongapo News was a newspaper of general circulation in 1978 in Morong, Bataan.

Susana Curiano, who was presented as a witness for the petitioners in this case, and not for the respondents, as the former had erroneously written in its petition, testified that the Olongapo News was the only newspaper in general circulation in Bataan during the time that the notice of auction sale was published.


Deputy Sheriff Renato Robles testified that in the years 1977, 1978, and 1979, there was only one newspaper of general circulation in Bataan, and this was the Olongapo News.

Cesar De La Torre, who was the very first editor of the Olongapo News, testified that this newspaper had prepaid subscribers in Olongapo City, Zambales and Bataan. 24 Further, he testified that prior to the year 1979, it was only the Olongapo News which was considered as a newspaper of general circulation that was authorized to publish legal notices in the province of Bataan.


Respondent Democrito Perez, substituted now by Erlinda and Maria Cecilia M. Perez, presented evidence to prove that in other cases requiring publication in Morong, Bataan, the publications were made in the Olongapo News, and the publication requirements of the law were deemed complied with.


In the year 1978, there is no question that the Olongapo News was not published in Morong, Bataan. It was published in Olongapo. However, this does not mean that the requirements of P.D. No. 1079 on the publication of notices of auction sales were not followed by the respondents herein. P.D. No. 1079 is categorical that in the event there is no newspaper or periodical published in the locality, the same may be published in the newspaper or periodical published, edited and circulated in the nearest city or province. 27 Since no newspaper of general circulation was being published in Morong, Bataan, in the year 1978, then the respondents were right in availing themselves of the services of the Olongapo News, which, as found by the trial court, was the nearest publication in Bataan.


To recapitulate, the Olongapo News is a newspaper of general circulation because it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information, it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, it is published at regular intervals and it is not devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. Being a newspaper of general circulation, petitioners are, thus, deemed to have constructive notice of the foreclosure proceedings. Therefore, the public auction sale is valid for having complied with all the requirements of the law.

G.R. No. 143768 March 28, 2005.