It is petitioner’s initial posture that the
pre-qualification requirement of employing a qualified resident project
engineer under P.D. No. 1594 is mandatory, not merely permissive as ruled by
the respondent Ombudsman. To petitioner, the Ombudsman erroneously relied on
Section 1B4-4C of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of P.D. No. 1594
in dismissing its complaint. The provision reads:
The following papers shall, among others, comprise Pre-C. Each office/agency/corporation shall have the discretion to specify whether any of the documentation listed below shall form part of the Pre-C:
c) Actual employment or contract to employ duly qualified project manager and project engineer who have managed or supervised at least a project of similar nature as to type and costs. (Emphasis supplied)
In faulting the Ombudsman for ruling as merely
permissive the resident-project-engineer requirement on the basis of the
above-quoted provision of the IRR, petitioner points out that the provision
thus relied upon by the Ombudsman had long been repealed by Section 1B4-5-C of
the 1995 IRR of P.D. No. 1594, which recites:
- The following papers shall, among others, comprise Pre-C:
c. List of key personnel employed or to be employed in the project with complete qualification and experience data sheet. (Emphasis supplied)
In stressing the mandatory, not merely
permissive, nature of the resident-project-engineer requirement, petitioner
made much of the word “shall” in the aforequoted provision and the
fact that the phrase “shall have the discretion” found in the former
Section 1B4-4C, supra, no longer appears in the repealing provision of Section
Petitioner’s submission does not persuade.
There is nothing in Section 1B4-5-C that deprives the contracting agency concerned of its discretion to specify whether any of the documentation listed under the former rule (Section 1B4-4C) shall form part of the Pre-C. As it were, Section 1B4-5-C (the new provision) merely classifies the “list of key personnel employed or to be employed in the project with complete qualification and experience data sheet,” as among the papers to comprise the Pre-C. And even assuming that a project engineer is one of the key personnel in the construction project, Section 1B4-5-C itself allows the employment of key personnel even after the bidding. This is as should be as the provision adverted to speaks of “list of key personnel employed or to be employed” in the project. In short, both the former and new provisions of the IRR of P.D. No. 1594 do not indispensably require actual employment of a project engineer at the time of submission of the Pre-C. The old provision (Section 1B4-4C) spoke of “actual employment or contract to employ,” while the 1995 version (Section 1B4-5-C) uses the clause “list of key personnel employed or to be employed” in the project. Doubtless, both versions allow post bidding employment of a project engineer. We thus sustain as correct the ruling of the Ombudsman on the permissive nature of the pre-qualification requirement relative to the employment of a project engineer.
Petitioner insists, however, that the mandatory nature of the requirement of actual hiring of a project engineer at the time of pre-qualification is made clearer in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1594 which reads:
Section 2. Detailed Engineering. No bidding and/or award of contract for a construction project shall be made unless the detailed engineering investigations, surveys, and designs for the project have been sufficiently carried out in accordance with the standards and specifications to be established under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to Section 12 of this Decree so as to minimize quantity and cost overruns and underruns, change orders and extra work orders, and unless the detailed engineering documents have been approved by the Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may be.
Petitioner would interpret the provision as
mandating the prospective contractor-bidder to conduct detailed engineering work
on a project. Ergo, so petitioner concludes, the actual hiring of a resident
project engineer at the time of bidding is mandatory, the engineer hired being
tasked to handle the technical and engineering aspects of the construction.
Again, petitioner is wrong.
As may be noted, the above-quoted provision of Section 2 of P.D. No. 1594 requires that a detailed engineering be carried out before any bidding or contract award for a construction project. Obviously, this requirement is addressed to the agency concerned, not to a bidder. It is from this detailed engineering that the concerned agency can get an estimate of the project, which it will use as basis in the evaluation of the bids. A bidder has no participation in carrying out the detailed engineering of a project. This is clear from Title 1, paragraph 4(g) of the IRR of P.D. No. 1594, to wit:
g. Agency Estimate – The Agency Estimate of
construction cost shall be prepared by official(s) duly designated by
the Head of office/agency/corporation concerned or by his duly
authorized representative. It shall be approved by the Head of the
office/agency/corporation or his duly designated representative.
The approved agency estimate (AAE) shall be finalized on the day of the bidding after all bids have been received and shall be held confidential and signed, sealed and ready for presentation on the day of the opening of the bids/tenders. (Emphasis supplied)
Designating a bidder to carry out the detailed
engineering of a project would doubtless be greatly prejudicial to other
bidders. With this scenario, such a bidder will know in advance the agency
estimate of the project and be able to offer the lowest bid.
In any event, assuming, in gratia argumenti, that the employment of a resident engineer is required to be stated in the submission of bidding documents, Muñoz Construction may be considered as having substantially complied with such requirement. Record shows that the firm submitted the name of the replacement of Armario after the latter severed ties with his employer. Besides, under the IRR of P.D. No. 1594, the government is given the discretion to waive minor deviations from the requirements. We quote the pertinent provisions of the IRR:
A bid which does not comply with the conditions or requirements of the bid documents shall be rejected by the PBAC (or the Bid and Award Committee as the case may be) giving the reason or reasons for its rejection. The government, however, in the evaluation of bids received, reserves the right to waive the consideration of minor deviations in the bids received which do not affect the substance and validity of the bids.
The government, however, reserves the right to reject any or all bids; to declare a failure of bidding if there is, among others, reason to suspect evident collusion among contractors resulting in no competition; to waive any required formality in the bids received; and to disregard any bid which is obviously unbalanced, (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the University’s PBAC
found the perceived infraction ascribed to Muñoz Construction too
minor to warrant rejection of its bid. The Court loathes to interfere with
PBAC’s estimation on a matter within its competence, if not sound prerogative.
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function. The discretion given to authorities to accept or reject a bid is of such wide latitude that courts will not interfere, unless it is apparent that it is exercised arbitrarily, or, in the language of Bureau Veritas vs. Office of the President, used as a shield to a fraudulent award. The exercise of that discretion is a policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task can best be discharged by the concerned government agencies, not by the courts. The role of the courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries. Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, they stray into the realm of policy decision-making.
Here, the PBAC contextually acted well within its bounds of discretion. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against respondent Ombudsman in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
This brings us to the second issue herein raised. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman had treated the preliminary investigation as a trial when his duty is limited to the determination of probable cause.
There is no dispute that the function of a preliminary investigation is to determine the existence of probable cause. It must be stressed, however, that as early as in the cases of U.S. v. Grant and Haashim v. Boncan, the Court has ruled that the ultimate purpose of a preliminary investigation is “to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.”
In its petition, petitioner states:
In ruling that the complaint should be dismissed for “insufficiency of evidence” the Honorable Ombudsman earnestly treated the preliminary investigation as a trial xxx.
A dismissal based on “insufficiency of
evidence” is not tantamount to conducting the preliminary investigation as
a trial. Petitioner points out that it is the purpose of a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there is probable cause, as Pilapil
vs. Sandiganbayan defined the term
xxx the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
It is to be stressed that it is only through
evidence that a prosecutor, or the Ombudsman in this case, can determine the
existence of such facts and circumstances constituting probable cause.
Dismissing a complaint based on “insufficiency of evidence” simply
means a want of evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause. Nowhere does
the Ombudsman state in his assailed resolution that his dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint was based on insufficiency of evidence to sustain
a conviction. Only in the latter instance could the Ombudsman be possibly
accused of treating the preliminary investigation as a trial.
Petitioner has made much of Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan to bolster its arguments. However, petitioner’s reliance on said case is misplaced, the factual milieu thereof being entirely different from the one at hand. In Olivarez, what was assailed was the Ombudsman’s decision to reverse a recommendation to dismiss a case. There, the Court actually upheld the decision of the Ombudsman. In fact, Olivarez argues even against the petitioner’s cause as we further stated in that case that courts should not interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of investigatory and prosecutory powers granted it by the Constitution, thus:
The Ombudsman’s conformity thereto is but an exercise of his powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
Indeed, the Court has almost always adopted, quite aptly, a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutional mandated powers. The Ombudsman even has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation. To insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as Rep. Act No. 6770 saw fit to endow that office with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings unless they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. This is basically his call.
The last issue raised by the petitioner relative to the negative finding of the Ombudsman as to the non-existence of probable cause against respondent University officials unquestionably relates to an exercise of judgment, not of jurisdiction. It cannot be overemphasized that in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the inquiry is limited essentially on whether or not the public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion presupposes that the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The grave abuse of discretion angle is completely absent in the present case.
Just like the extraordinary writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus is unavailing to petitioner. For, basic is the rule that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial, as opposed to a discretionary, duty. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct such decision, erroneous though it may be.True, mandamus is likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in the particular way urged by the petitioner. In the performance of an official duty involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other, except where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
Petitioner’s allegation that the act of respondent University officials of awarding the contract in question to Muñoz Construction notwithstanding the alleged flaw in its bid gave unwarranted benefits to a private party and caused undue damage to the government cannot be given cogency.
As respondents correctly assert in their Comment, even assuming that the employment of a resident project engineer is required to be stated in the submission of bidding documents, Muñoz Construction may still be considered to have substantially complied with such requirement since a project engineer had been named to replace its former project engineer.
Needless to stress, respondents did not grant any benefit in favor of any person not qualified therefor or not legally entitled thereto. Nor was there any injury to the government. Muñoz Construction had presented the lowest complying and responsive bid. Accordingly, the award to it of the construction contract in question is most advantageous to the government. For sure, such was the proper course of action under the circumstances obtaining in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioner.
SOURCE:[ G.R. NO. 133517, January 30, 2006 ]ALBAY ACCREDITED CONSTRUCTORS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS DULY AUTHORIZED SECRETARY, RODOLFO L. MADRID, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, LYLIA CORPORAL-SENA, OSCAR L. LANDAGAN, PRE-QUALIFICATION BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE (PBAC) OF BICOL UNIVERSITY, AND ITS MEMBERS, NAMELY: EDUARDO M. LORIA, CIELO L. REX, AMALIA A. SARET, AND DONATO F. M. BAÑARES, AND LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR., RESPONDENTS. Tags: Alcantara Alcoy moral damages Alegria actual damages Aloguinsan Argao Asturias Badian Balamban Bantayan Barili Boljoon Borbon Carmen Catmon Compostela Consolacion Cordova Daanbantayan Dumaguete Bais Sibulan Tampi Bacong Negros Bacolod Separation pay Resign Resignation Back wages Backwages Length of service pay benefit employee employer relationship Silay Kabankalan Daan Bantayan Dalaguete Dumanjug Ginatilan Liloan compensatory damages Madridejos Malabuyoc Medellin Minglanilla Moalboal Oslob Pilar Pinamungajan Poro Ronda Samboan San Fernando San Francisco San Remigio Sante Fe Santander Sibonga Sogod Tabogon Tabuelan Tuburan attorney’s fees Tudela exemplary damages Camotes General Luna Siargao Cagayan Davao Kidapawan Attorney Abogado Lawyer Architect Real Estate Broker nominal damages Sales Agent Properties for Sale Looking for Buyers Design Build House and Lot for Sale for Rent Talisay City Mandaue City Lapu Lapu Lapu-Lapu City Yncierto Sesante Villanueva Ruz Jan Edmond Marc Tim Timothy temperate damages Luz liquidated damages Kristin tct transfer certificate of title tax declaration birth certificate relocation survey surveying judicial titling administrative titling patent title denr cenro foreshore lease ecc environmental compliance certificate design build architect cebu engineer interior design designer residential commercial cebu property warehouse for rent for lease marc Christian yncierto ruz jan Edmond yncierto ruz Kristin Villanueva ruz Edmond mabalot ruz marriage certificate timber land forest land watershed agricultural lot land use conversion hearing trial illegal drugs trial lawyer business corporate lawyer labor lawyer immigration law bureau of immigration cebu 9g visa search warrant warrant of arrest motion to quash information complaint police officers buy bust physical suffering shocked horrified mental anguish fright serious anxiety besmirched reputation sleepless nights wounded feelings moral shock social humiliation similar injuries